Public procurement and organized crime – illustrated with examples from Bulgaria, Italy and Norway by Andvig, Jens Christopher
  
NUPI Working Paper 813
Department of International Economics
Jens Christopher Andvig
N
orsk U
tenrikspolitisk Institutt
N
orw
egian Institute of International Affairs
Public procurement and organized 
crime – illustrated with examples  
from Bulgaria, Italy and Norway
Publisher: 
Copyright:
Visiting address:
Address:
Internet:
E-mail:
Fax:
Tel:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
© Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2012
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author.
C.J. Hambros plass 2d
P.O. Box 8159 Dep. 
NO-0033 Oslo, Norway 
www.nupi.no
info@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 99 40 50
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
Abstract
The paper provides a semi-popular exposition of the formulation of public procurement and pri-
vatization mechanisms and how they may be influenced by organized crime units. A number of 
possibilities are outlined using examples from Bulgaria, Italy and Norway.
Jens Christopher Andvig
Public procurement and organized 
crime – illustrated with examples 
from Bulgaria, Italy and Norway
1  The author will like to thank the Center for the Study  of Democracy, Sofia for economic 
support and a stimulating research environment. This paper is a follow up to an Innovation 
Norway supported project under the Bulgarian-Norwegian Cooperation Programme.

1. Introduction: Public procurement 
and the distribution of political 
rents 
Public procurement gives rise to a large share of the rents that may 
end up as private illegitimate income from public governance process-
es. A major, almost banal reason is that when money is transferred 
internally in a public organization, it remains only accounting or spe-
cific-use money. When it leaves public control, it becomes non-
specific, cash-like. It may be spent on anything. It is when the public 
sector procures larger items from the private sector that “cash” leaves 
in large bulks which may give an opportunity for siphoning out larger 
amounts as generally disposable rents. In an accompanying paper 
(Andvig and Todorov, 2011) we have seen how public procurement 
rents may either be shared between procurers and suppliers through 
corruption or be shared among suppliers through cartel-making.  
 
In that paper we looked mostly on the situation from the point of 
views of suppliers and the impact of bid rules, how the private suppli-
ers sometimes try to protect themselves against the inbuilt insecurity 
through criminal means or try to use their informational advantages 
for illegitimate profit. Here we will look at procurement more from 
the side of procurers. Here the EU appears to have formulated fewer 
rules except the general one that whichever organization that does the 
public procurement, it should organize its bid competitions in such 
way that EU’s bid rules are followed. Even in countries that try to iso-
late the procurement decisions from line administration to make the 
procurers more independent,2 the reality of the situation is that the 
granting of contracts is also a disposal of political favors. Procurers 
like any other public bureaucrats have to be sensitive to political sig-
nals to ensure job survival and promotion prospects whatever the for-
mal rule they are supposed to obey. 
 
From this follows several implications. To really understand how 
larger procurement decisions are made it rarely suffices to study the 
interaction between the immediate procurement officers and the sup-
pliers. For example, if a supplier in a country with extensive corrup-
                                                 
2  In this way the decisions could be more strictly focused on the price and quality of the 
services and goods to be acquired, (an example of this is Statoil’s procurement organiza-
tion. See Andvig, 1995). It also has a backside: If such isolation is successful and procur-
ers are really isolated from the line, the risk of direct capture by suppliers is likely to in-
crease. 
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tion problems try to win a contract by bribing the procurement officer 
only, he is likely to be disappointed. Somehow the politicians have to 
get a share – if political corruption is common. Even if it is not, public 
procurement decisions are important for the allocation of political fa-
vors, and in both cases the principles behind that distribution are diffi-
cult to assess from the outside. 
2. Middlemen, mafia and the col-
lection of information on informal 
contract power 
Politicians are not the only ones who congregate around the rent cap-
turing opportunities inherent in public procurement processes, howev-
er. From our study of corruption in the North Sea petroleum industry 
(Andvig, 1995) we demonstrated the importance of the existence of 
middlemen, so called information brokers then, for the corruption po-
tential in that industry’s procurement. The main form was to buy ille-
gally bid information from the procuring agency and sell the infor-
mation to one or several of the bidders. The existence of such mid-
dlemen reduced the search costs necessary to complete a corrupt deal 
and was likely to increase the frequency of corrupt transactions in a 
“market” where only a minority was likely to engage deliberately in 
corruption at each side. 
 
Most of this information was of technical or economic nature. As 
pointed out in della Porta and Vannucci (1999: 173) their roles were in 
several respects similar to the middlemen who have operated in public 
procurement processes in Italy. When it comes to public procurement 
such technical information is not sufficient, however. The actual pro-
cesses of reaching contract decisions are often complex and murky, 
influenced by a variety of political games. Their complexity combined 
with their importance has made it standard procedure for foreign bid-
ders to employ middlemen who know (or pretend to know) these 
games so that they may influence the right people in the right way in-
cluding paying them bribes. In the old (pre-1995) days one was quite 
frank about it and textbooks in international business presented reci-
pes about how to treat such middlemen (e.g. Marsh, 1989).  
 
In their book on political corruption in Italy, however, della Porta and 
Vannucci (1999) describe a set of middlemen who are linking the in-
formal procurement procedures (the politicians) to the suppliers from 
the inside and not only by dealing in information but through other 
more hand fast illegitimate means of influence; middlemen belonging 
to well-known mafia organizations.  
 
Since it is inherently difficult to for outsiders (such as researchers) to 
trace the actual political processes that impact public procurement, it 
is extremely difficult to find any good empirical basis for propositions 
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about their workings. The famous “mani pulite” investigations initiat-
ed in Milan early 1992 that snowballed through Italy and where many 
members of the political class were investigated and sentenced, gave 
us a rare glimpse into the mechanisms through which political rents 
derived from procurement may be collected. The extent to which the 
methods found there simply were a peculiarity of the political system 
including the voting procedures (Newell, 2006) and/or the organized 
crime complex found in Italy in the early 1990s or if they reflect some 
more general features of countries with a fairly corrupt political elite 
and a noticeable organized crime complex, will of course be impossi-
ble to determine empirically on the basis of a single case. Neverthe-
less, on this Italian basis we may surmise how public procurement and 
political corruption may be linked elsewhere.  
 
It is also worthwhile in the following to note that the influence is two-
ways: political rent-seeking is somehow influencing the procuring de-
cisions while the choice of what, where and how to procure influence 
the rent-seeking possibilities among the politicians and the population 
at large. At least in the specific case of Italy in the early 1990s they 
were both influenced by organized crime however narrowly we define 
the latter. 
 
Bulgaria is another country where organized crime is considered to 
have influence on the distribution of political rents including the ones 
generated under public procurement processes. It is also to some ex-
tent documented through research. This research could not be based 
on equally detailed description of actual mechanisms as was possible 
in Italy No large number public court cases have become available 
there as was the case in Italy. Nevertheless it is based on longer se-
quences of systematic observations of crime organizations at fairly 
close quarters than most other research of its kind.3 
 
As a matter of comparison with the situation in a country where orga-
nized crime is hardly any significant problem in public procurement 
processes I have chosen to look at Norway. Even here organized crime 
issues have popped up in a few cases. While these should for the most 
part only be considered as random events they may also indicate areas 
where public procurement may become vulnerable to organized crime 
activities. What is interesting here is that as income and the direction 
of public expenditures change, so do to some extent the vulnerability 
areas. 
 
Returning to countries where organized crime organizations appear to 
have serious impact: Are their vulnerabilities showing up in the same 
                                                 
3  A summary of this research is presented in in Bezlov, Tzenkov et al, 2007. A work that 
seeks to 
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arenas in countries exposed to larger clusters of organized crime, or 
are they distributed differently, depending on the structure and history 
of the society or structure of the organized crime organizations in 
question? What kind of involvement risks for public procurement 
might develop from organized crime in these countries where orga-
nized crime is believed to be a more significant policy issue? How 
important is historical specificity for the kind of influence organized 
crime may wield? Here a comparison between Bulgaria and Italy may 
prove pertinent, but I will also use the analyses and results in Bezlov 
et al (2010) for several other European countries including present Ita-
ly, although this study is more focused on the more traditional market 
for illegal goods and services than public procurement. 
 
3. Organized crime defined. A choice 
In his witty introduction to Duyne et al (2006) van Duyne underlines 
the importance of making a choice when it comes to a definition of 
organized crime, and particularly so when one seeks to make a quanti-
tative analysis. While not attempting the latter here, the choice is of 
course important. For example, if following one van Duyne (van Duy-
ne, 2006 where he describes the secrecy sought in a specific cartel) we 
may consider regular cartel-making as an organized form of crime. It 
is by definition organized and participation in a cartel has become 
criminal in most European countries now. If successful, it may last for 
decades as the one van Duyne analyzed and that asphalt cartels in the 
Nordic countries are likely to have (Andvig and Todorov, 2011) Simi-
larly, bribes involve at least two agents, hence is organized, and it is 
criminal, but it may be a one-time affair and may not satisfy the de-
mand of being a lasting activity/organization as has become one fairly 
standard criterion when defining organized crime.  
 
We already have covered these organized crime activities. As already 
mentioned, here we will focus on the political side of illegitimate pub-
lic procurement in which traditional organized crime organizations 
that dispose instruments of violence in their organizational repertoire. 
They will often work as subgroups among power brokers, consultants 
or middlemen that rely on information handling only. 
 
Van Duyne argues –sensibly – that one weakness in most political 
definitions of organized crime is that they on the one side is based on 
a conception of organized crime as a kind of bogey man: subterranean, 
dangerous and therefore easily overblown in size, organizational ca-
pabilities and influence. On the other side the definition will also em-
brace rather trivial activities such as the smuggling or selling drugs by 
single citizens who naturally have to buy the stuff somewhere, giving 
these a sinister stamp they don’t deserve. Moreover, by focusing on 
criminals supposedly being members of some large underground hier-
archical organization or some network, one may study something that 
may not exist in many countries, and one may lose track of the many 
criminal activities performed by members of the “upper-world” organ-
izations, all the respectable ones. The focus should in most cases be 
focused on activities not membership. 
 
Here I will like to choose a definition that may connect the public per-
ception of organized crime as something very dangerous with a con-
crete set of activities. It is in fact close to the standard one proposed in 
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many of the analyses of organized crime made by economists, for ex-
ample the one proposed by Kumar and Skaperdas (2008): 
 
  “the defining activity of an organized crime group – in the absence of which its 
other activities could not take place at all or their nature will drastically change is 
the provision of protection. Protection is not an ordinary economic activity. It is 
supposed to protect the ownership of other goods and make their contractual ex-
change enforceable. And that enforceability does not come from the law or the 
courts – to which ordinary security firm and its clients have access – but ulti-
mately from the barrel of a Mafioso’s gun.” 
 
This definition is somewhat narrow for our purpose. It may fit nicely 
for Italy, somewhat for Bulgaria, but not at all for Norway. Organized 
crime will be defined away for that country. Nevertheless, to let all 
kinds of organized crime such as cartel-making be included is some-
what too wide for our purposes. Somehow, the deliberate use of in-
struments of violence as an essential part of the criminal design should 
be included in the definition as a distinguishing mark. 
 
 It is particularly the fear of being exposed to random violence (from 
the point of view of an “innocent” citizen) from individuals perceived 
to be outside the regular society that induces the popular fear of orga-
nized crime. Moreover instruments of violence give rise to strong in-
centive systems that may be applied for many other reasons than pro-
tection of property rights.4 It may be used as internal disciplinary de-
vice, may be used to appropriate goods and services by force, appro-
priate rents or influence their division, etc. Applied once, and unlike 
monetary rewards, it may work for free a number of times through 
reputation mechanisms. It leaves its hail marks on what kind of ac-
tions individuals may be willing and able to do as well as the conse-
quences of their actions. Importantly, through their triggering of fear, 
the use of forces may have a variety of spill-over effects difficult to 
control for its own practitioners. When practiced by an organized, dis-
ciplined group it then has to be controlled. I will tentatively keep the 
analysis of organized crime within the confines of the following defi-
nition: 
 
With organized crime I will mean a repetitive string of actions performed by 
several individuals wherein at least one action is criminal and at least one of the 
actions presuppose the use or threat of force in order to implement the action 
string. Force includes the active use (or threat of use) of instruments of violence 
to create bodily harm or to kill, and the ability to implement incarceration. The 
motivation for implementing the criminal string is normally economic profit. The 
performers of the string may embrace members who are deliberately involved in 
its implementation, the members of the organized crime organization, as well as 
the outside performers who may indirectly contribute to the implementation of 
the string without necessarily knowing the links and the outcome. Hence, the 
                                                 
4  For a brief but thoughtful discussion of the role of force in various incentive systems, see 
chapter 2 in Wiles (1977). 
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string may link performers who are members of upper-world (van Duyne) as 
well as under-world organizations or both.5 If it is essential for its implementa-
tion that some of the actions take place in different countries, we define it as in-
ternational organized crime. 
 
This definition is focused on action sequences, not organizational 
membership. In principle the actions may be linked through a regular 
hierarchical organization, a network of individuals or simply through 
an infrastructure where new groups may enter. From an empirical 
point of view it may be difficult to determine whether a certain crimi-
nal act (such as illegal trafficking of women) is organized in our sense 
by being somehow linked to the application of force (or threat of 
force) as input, or not. Sometimes it may be easier to follow the main 
other alternative to build up a definition: to determine who is member 
of a mafia-type of organization and who is not. In the case of public 
procurement in Italy it may imply that one needs to guess mate which 
politician who are strongly influenced by which mafia organization 
and then to try to determine their network connections to other deci-
sion makers. Finally, one would then explore the kind of network 
members that appear to be involved in each major procurement deci-
sion. Needless to add, even if all this was supposedly public 
knowledge, information of this kind is rather speculative. Network 
links are hardly sufficient to explain action. In court cases evidence of 
this kind can only be circumstantial. A string of action will have to be 
established. 
 
When judging eventual welfare loss connected to crime, the string of 
action point of view has some advantages. For example, the illegal 
cross-border trafficking of women when the criminal organization ap-
ply no force may cause far less welfare loss (may even cause a net 
welfare gain after the welfare loss connected to the criminal part of the 
action string is subtracted) than if the same action is connected to the 
threat of force. 
 
Typically, larger organized crime structures (more complex strings) 
don’t evolve initially through its rents from public procurement deci-
sions6, but either through 1) more or less localized weakness of the 
                                                 
5  If an illegal organization that traffic women across national borders against payment and 
use the importing countries anti-migration (and/or anti-prostitution) laws to threaten the 
women to inform the police if it doesn’t get a cut from their income as prostitutes, it will 
become an organized crime organization according to this definition. It uses the police’s 
legal means of force as part of their deliberate criminal strategy. If it just traffics the 
women across the borders against profit and then give a dam, the organization falls out-
side the domain of our definition.  
6  Bulgaria may be an exception here due to the role of the initial large scale privatization. 
As argued in Andvig and Todorov (2011) procurement and privatization processes are of-
ten quite symmetrical. While rents may be appropriated in procurement through above 
market prices, rents may be appropriated in privatization through prices below the market 
rates. The difference is, of course, that in procurement rents may be appropriated at once 
or through a short construction periods while privatization rents may only be appropriated 
through either the reselling or actual management of the real assets that are acquired. 
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state monitoring and control apparatuses that allows private competi-
tors in the protection business to rise or 2) through the handling of il-
legal goods or services where there are considerable returns to scale 
connected to at least one point in the string. In practical terms a weak 
and/or corrupt police force is a precondition for both, but more so for 
1).  
 
Let us first look at a Norwegian case of an organized crime structure. 
 
4. Organized crime in Norway – any 
links to procurement? 
As indicated above, there are no real indications that organized crime 
according to our definition is any major issue in Norway. The most 
likely reasons are its high GDP level and the associated fairly high 
efficiency of its police. The few areas where any systematic use of vi-
olence is observed are mainly connected to gangs organized around 
drug sales, debt collection7 and probably also some trafficking activi-
ties. The impacts of these strings of organized crime on public pro-
curement are likely to be zero or negligible. Neither prostitution ser-
vices nor drugs are officially procured by any public organization alt-
hough sometimes by their members. Some weak and indirect links to 
criminal forms of debt collection are at least thinkable, but I’m not 
aware of any actual cases where the debt collection institutions that 
have been used by the public authorities to settle debts have applied 
violence specialists. 
 
The impact of organized crime on public procurement is mainly taking 
place on the labor market and is related to the high Norwegian labor 
costs and relative high wages for unskilled or low-skilled labor. The 
underlying explanation is fairly obvious: while wage levels for un-
skilled labor in Norway below 12 – 15 Euros are considered socially 
unacceptable, the minimum wages in countries like Poland and Bul-
garia are less than a half Euro.8 On the top of that both pension and 
other forms of social costs are higher in Norway than most other Eu-
ropean countries. Needless to add this creates significant tensions. If a 
straightforward opening up of the labor market so Polish employers on 
a wide scale could simply hire Polish workers and pay them close to 
Polish wage rates for doing work in Norway it would create unbeara-
ble tensions. A number of legal frictions have to be built in9, frictions 
that the wide gap makes it potentially very profitable to circumvent. 
                                                 
7  Here we can observe interesting developments partly due to the exceptionally strict pun-
ishments for delayed payments in Norway and the financial liberalization taking place the 
last two decades. The latter has allowed institutions to resell claim packages on financial 
markets, and when combined with the high punishment rates for unfulfilled debts, this has 
become a profitable business. The organizations that are able to squeeze payments out of 
the lowest quality claims naturally are the ones that have an ability to resort to violence. 
Hence, Norway has developed a sort of organized cooperation between the underground 
Hell Angels type of organizations and upper world financial institutions. While interesting 
and largely unexplored, these developments are unlikely to have any impact on public 
procurement in Norway. 
8  Norway doesn’t have any legal determined minimum wages, but they are given more 
area-specific minimum wages determined through bargaining between trade unions and 
employers’ organizations.  
9  A number of them are described in Alsos et al (2008). 
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And it is particularly so in public bidding contests when the lowest 
price bids are supposed to be winning ones. Bidders who somehow are 
able to get labor cheap are likely to win. 
 
Recently a number of cases have reached the public where winners of 
municipal service contracts have hired foreign labor power at below 
Norwegian acceptable wage rates under illegal conditions, for exam-
ple by delaying their payment in order to make them stay longer, etc.10 
Have the organizations that have imported foreign labor power in ille-
gal ways also directly or indirectly used or threatened to use violence 
towards their employees? While the foreign workers and their em-
ployers may have common (short-run) ex ante interests in avoiding 
wage regulatory measures, ex post their interests may diverge, particu-
larly when the workers have been exposed to cheating.  
 
Knowing that, the importers have some additional means of physical 
control over foreign labor power since it is difficult for a single, un-
employed foreign worker to get the necessary work and residence 
permits on their own. They normally need an employer to get this. If 
they are fired, they may not be able to stay in the country. Whether 
this is a sufficient ground for classifying the organizations that do 
some form of illegal social dumping as organized criminal ones, may 
be doubtful. The level of physical force to be applied may be too 
weak. This is borderline activity. Hopefully, the ability to physically 
control their foreign employees are likely to weaken as the different 
nationalities get a broader base of fellow country men and women that 
may ease their jump from one employment in Norway to another. 11 
 
Except for this borderline case, I have only found one example of an 
organized crime unit that has been significantly involved in Norwe-
gian public procurement contests. The case is somewhat bizarre, but it 
nevertheless highlights interesting aspects of Norwegian public poli-
cies and also some asymmetric information problems that is part of 
the governance issues that arise in public bid competitions.  
 
                                                 
10  The large Swiss-owned enterprise (Addecco) that originally only did labor exchange, but 
now also collect labor for collective service contracts has recently received extraordinary 
public attention for breaking Norwegian rules regarding wages and working conditions. 
From a quantitative point of view the impact on the outcome of public procurement con-
test for large building contracts have probably been more significant, but then as sub- or 
rather sub-sub-contractors.. 
11  This is an area where we are still missing systematic research in Norway. That situation 
may change in the wake of the so called Adecco scandal. Studies from the Netherlands 
(e.g. van Duyne, 2006), where conditions in many ways are similar to Norway in the 
sense that wage costs are higher than in surrounding areas, make it likely that this be-
come, if it not already is, an area of serious economic crime, although the violence com-
ponent may not become serious. 
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The background12 was that a foreign-born (Iranian-Turkish back-
ground ) medical doctor received a specialist education in psychiatry 
in Norway and established an organization, the St. Lucia Foundation 
to take care of difficult (supposedly) orphanage youths with foreign 
background. He proved to be an imaginative criminal entrepreneur. 
He and his family had already established links to international drug 
smuggling organizations and had acquired ownership of a number of 
restaurants before he went into the care business. The private St. Lucia 
foundation won several contracts from the municipalities of Oslo and 
Akershus. It operated with a sub-contracting enterprise to which the 
psychiatrist moved most of the private profit from the care activities. 
At one point of time his set-up took care of four difficult youths 
against a payment of about 4500 euro per night. He recruited several 
of his staff by giving them permanent disability pensions and then let 
them work black in both his restaurants and his profitable charity 
foundation. The difficult youths got “nice” social training by these 
partly criminal employees including a well-known violent debt collec-
tor. They showed less indication of psychic disorders except that they 
now got involved in a large burglary streak under competent leader-
ship. 
 
The fields of operation chosen were classical Norwegian, care busi-
ness for difficult youths and care for the elderly, but otherwise he or-
ganized classical Mafia-like operations. A competing care-making or-
ganization was exposed to arson, informants threatened, and so on. 
 
These organized, criminal actions strings were finally exposed when 
this psychiatrist delivered and got the contract for a municipal-owned 
house that housed a famous group of left-wing occupiers (Blitz) who 
had lived in the house for years. The conservative municipality would 
like to see them thrown out. Since he disposed so many violence ca-
pabilities, the psychiatrist could make a better bid than any other or-
ganization. The high publicity level of the occupiers became his bane, 
however, and in the end a large part of his criminal network was ex-
posed and the psychiatrist received several years jail sentence. 
 
This is probably a rather unique growth of a classical mafia-like or-
ganization in Norway. Its leader was able to gain some influence in 
the Oslo municipality thanks to a mixture of his good education and 
social respectability combined with a certain naivety (?) on the part of 
the procurers. It revealed also that the procurers were unable to do any 
                                                 
12  The following brief story is base on prize-winning journalistic work of the then VG-
employed journalists Strand and Widerøe. During their work they were exposed to serious 
violent threats from the subjects of their research. In addition to the Scoop report to the 
prize-giving institution (Widerøe and Strand (2004), the story is outlined in a series of ar-
ticles in the newspaper VG from this period. The easiest way to locate the stories is 
through the name of the main criminal (psychiatrist) entrepreneur, Ezazi. 
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serious quality control in this case as well as in recent Adecco scandal 
cases of social dumping. Nevertheless, the criminal organization that 
had turned towards public procurement processes apparently has not 
been able to survive under Norwegian conditions, or so we may hope. 
 
5. Role of classical Mafia and public 
procurement in Italy: regionally 
confined? 
Both Norway and Italy are economically advanced countries. Like 
Norway public procurement in general and public construction in par-
ticular are among the set of public activities with the highest corrup-
tion risks.13 Nevertheless, on average it is rare to see large clusters of 
organized crime to develop under such conditions. Norway is here 
typical while Italy apparently is an exception. Its experience indicates 
that larger organized crime clusters may survive even in modern 
economies at least if they are already established when modernization 
proceeds. It is quite trivial, as we will see, that if a mafia-like organi-
zation in a given area has some power, it will influence the public pro-
curement processes in that area both at the procuring and at the sup-
plying ends. 
 
It is a more open question, however, whether the availability of such 
organizations with their violence-making capabilities have a serious 
impact on the kind of strings of criminal actions that are available at 
the national level. The evidence is mixed. On the one hand a number 
of politicians operating in cities in Northern Italy without old histori-
cally established mafia organizations were shown at least to have im-
portant links to mafia operators and to politicians with “proven” mafia 
connections in the large “clean hand” operation initiated in Milan. 14 
On the other hand, the regular use of violence appears to be mostly 
confined to the traditional mafia “infested” areas of the country. 
 
Today Gambetta’s (Gambetta, 1993) analysis of the rise of the Mafia 
in Sicily (and by implication the occurrence of a number of other or-
ganized, mostly geographically concentrated crime clusters in Italy 
such as Basilicata, Calabria and Naples) has been accepted by most 
researchers in the field as a most fruitful starting point. It is also the 
basis for the Kumar and Skaperdas (2008) definition above. The idea 
                                                 
13  Della Porta and Vannucci (1999: 65) refer to research from Italy where 396 corruption 
scandal episodes were explored. Of those 36,6% referred to public contracting episodes, 
28,1% to building permits. 
14  This was an historically exceptional operation where a large fraction of the Italian politi-
cal elite was incriminated (1/3 of the lower house representatives, five previous prime 
ministers and thousands of businessmen mostly connected to public contracting and the 
building industry). Between 1992 when the operation started and 2002 the Milan prosecu-
tors prepared 4520 corruption charges, 1300 were indicted and 1320 passed to other juris-
dictions (Golden and Piccci, 2006: 470). 
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is about the following: In the beginning in Sicily (maybe in the middle 
of the 19
th
 century), groups of people were hired to supply protection 
of the assets of large landowners in an uncertain legal and physical 
environment. This service was limited in scope and would not give 
rise to much expansion or give scope for increased mafia-organizatio-
nal complexity, however. The quintessential mafia task that made for 
expansion developed in surroundings of deep mutual trust between 
economic agents and under weak central government was rather to 
protect the implementation of contracts on markets riddled with fraud. 
The need for such protection was exceptionally great in markets with 
large informational asymmetries like the once important market for 
used horses,15 but where today either illegal goods such as drugs or 
building contracts are likely to be the most prominent. To implement 
such contracts a Mafioso has to work on both sides of the contract. 
The use or threat of using force is essential. When establishing a 
group with force potential, there obviously are great increasing returns 
to increase in scope: if the group is already protecting horse sales in a 
neighborhood it does not need much additional information or wea-
ponry to protect exchange in its fish market.  
 
Looking at its scale economies, it is a clear advantage to increase in 
size when it comes to eventual violent contests with mafia competi-
tors, but at the same time it increases its visibility and increase the risk 
for judicial actions. In practice it is probably a reasonable efficiency 
on the part of the police and courts that is most effective in containing 
the size of organized crime organizations as Reuter (1983) has con-
vincingly argued. 
 
Note that the police, if weakly monitored from an external center, may 
do many of the same tasks as a mafia organization. Within its space of 
operation the police may move rather freely across settings and de-
mand bribes for settling disputes or extort to refrain from using its in-
strument of violence. Hence, the police and organized crime may 
compete – often with violent results or may collude where the police 
receive bribes from its mafia organization as it allow them to keep 
their influence or expand. In any case, corrupt and weak police and 
judiciary appear to be keys to the original accumulation in mafia-like 
organizations.16 
 
                                                 
15  Cf. Gambetta’s (1988: 171 – 173) lively case of a Neapolitan couch man who had been 
tricked (in the year 1863) into buying a useless horse and had no remedy since his Camor-
ra protector was in jail. 
16  In some policy discussions the threat that organized crime organizations may invest in 
legal establishment is perceived as making them more dangerous – coming up from the 
deep they are spreading their tentacles into legal business, directing it from behind. Here 
we suggest rather that the decreasing returns to scale of crime when operating in a fairly 
efficient police environment makes it profitable to expand into legal business even when 
realized rate of return is higher in the criminal branches.  
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Finally, elected politicians normally have to win election contests 
within given local neighborhoods. To win them it is useful to know 
about the various issues, economic and social events that take place, 
what kind of developments that may receive popular support ex ante 
and what is likely to cause most severe set-backs ex post the election 
in the neighborhood. Hence, in neighborhoods where democracy has 
some force, but corruption is rampant, the police and organized crime 
units crisscross the same economic and social space as the politician. 
The latter may need the information they collect and the force they 
may wield to win elections.17 
 
If the original Mafioso accumulation stage is passed and the police 
and judiciary have grown in strength and honesty and begin to pursue 
them in earnest, the mafia may need political protection against the 
judiciary from the politicians in order to survive as large-scale organi-
zations. How much politicians here are able to offer depends on the 
degree of judicial independences. Seemingly small reforms here may 
make a notable difference.  
 
Another aspect of politicians’ behavior was equally important for lo-
cal mafia growth: it explained how the demand and supply for public 
works became like a used horses’ market and the most lucrative one 
from the mafia point of view. After World War II and until the early 
1990s a large expansion of public works took place in Italy with prior-
ity given to the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) where most of the local 
mafia-like organizations in Italy were working. Given the complexity 
on the demand or procuring side where shifting coalitions of politi-
cians together with public administrators at local and central levels 
may become the effective decision makers, it was difficult to tell who 
to bribe. Fraudulent claims of influence may easily arise; promises 
about who would get the contract may easily be broken. At the other 
side of the market promises of bribes to be paid, quality to be deliv-
ered and so on may also be broken, but with somewhat more difficul-
ty. In any case, this was a “market” where the state’s legal institutions 
with their legally stipulated punishments for broken contracts were 
unable to assist. Mafia organizations could. 
 
At the supply end mafia organizations were effective in stabilizing 
supply cartels. (della Porta and Vannucci, 1999: 228 – 231). Not only 
                                                 
17  Here the exact legal formulations of voting procedures as well as the local physical ar-
rangements may have important consequences and strengthen or weaken the potential of 
mafia organizations to have direct impact on election results. This is a rather complicated 
research field since the effect of one rule will hinge strongly on which other rules it is 
combined with. While they are not unimportant for our analysis, I will not delve into here, 
just observe that the degree of mafia influence on the direct electoral results has signifi-
cant impact on how the political rents from public procurement are likely to be divided 
between suppliers, politicians and the Mafioso. Parts of India appear to have evolved 
quite similar links between politicians, police and organized crime structures. 
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could they police whether the enterprises involved kept cartel agree-
ments, they could control that the procurers did not allow new enter-
prises to enter the new bid “competitions”. 
 
Given the fact that a larger share of local public works were directly 
financed from the central, national budget one would expect that the 
local mafias would seek and gain substantial influence also at the ear-
ly stages of project creation, how the expenditures were distributed 
across regions. As mentioned, here the evidence is mixed. From the 
pre-“clean hands” period della Porta and Vannucci describe the cen-
tral allocation of public funds for various forms of public procurement 
as dominated by political parties. Bribe collection of a party was mon-
itored by a centrally placed but often anonymous “cashier”. He orga-
nized the collection process so that bribe receivers from the party 
stuck to their deals in the corruption “market” – a market that was 
heavily influenced by public works and the bribes generated there. 
Furthermore, the cashier monitored whether the income was properly 
divided between the party and the bribe receivers’ personal accounts;. 
At higher levels rules for division of the bribe income between the dif-
ferent parties had to be negotiated. Given their strong influence on 
administrative officials, the parties could police their debt collection.18 
Bribe payment promises by the business enterprises could be policed 
partly through their fear of not receiving new contracts, partly through 
the business leaderships’ own frequently close relationship to one of 
the parties. No obvious need for Mafioso monitoring of this market 
seemed necessary from the della Porta and Vannucci description 
(ibid.: 97 -111) although it clearly was a market where cheating was 
easy in principle and the deals must have been loaded with substantial 
informational complexity.  
 
At the local level in the South party organizations were factionalized. 
The central party had less control and intermediation between local 
bosses became more important. One of the Mafioso task would be to 
make the different party factions stick to their corruption deals there. 
Presumably, something similar could happen at the central level and 
Golden and Picci (2006: 475) surmise that a recent diffusion of cor-
ruption in public works from the South to the North had taken place 
under the influence of organized crime. The difference though was 
that the mafia organizations could locally collect information about 
both entrepreneurs, workers, voters and politicians operating within 
the same rather narrow constituency.  
                                                 
18  The parties in Italy were much larger (and expensive) structures than what has been the 
case in the Nordic countries. According to della Porta and Vannucci (1999: 126) around 
1990 elected political personnel reached 160 000 and the number of people with income 
mainly related to political activities about 2 million. These number divided by ten should 
give the comparable Norwegian figures. They are far below Norwegian data with any rea-
sonable interpretation of what “related to’ may mean. 
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Their surmise of a spread of organized crime up to the north was 
based on an ingenious combination of data. One set was was a by-
product of the “clean hand” operation. It picked up the regional distri-
bution of legislators charged with corruption during the operation and 
reflected the situation around 1990. Some results were as expected: 
Sicily (Cosa Nostra), Calabria (Ndrangheta) and Campania (Camorra) 
were all among the highest share of perpetrators: 43-60% of legisla-
tors were charged in this group, but there were anomalies reflecting 
the connectedness to the initial Milan cases and the regional differ-
ences in severity of confession cascades.  
 
These observations were connected to the outcomes from a corruption 
indicator that used long time series of public construction data clever-
ly used to reveal long-lasting regional differences in corruption pro-
pensities, as well as specific effects of mafia-like organizations. The 
indicator was constructed as follows: (1) an existing indicator of the 
existing stock of physical infrastructure per capita in each region in 
1997 is compared to the national average. The southern regions on 
average possessed only 67% of the national average regarding physi-
cal infrastructure per head. Then a similar index (2) of the cumulated 
real flow value of resources the government had spent on acquiring 
this stock for each region was also compared to the national average.19 
Then they interpreted (1)/ 2) as a corruption indicator where lower 
numbers indicate higher corruption levels.  
 
Taking Campania (Camorra) as an example: It had a corruption index 
of 0.362 which means that this region received only about 1/3 of as 
much physical infrastructure for each lire invested compared to the 
national average. If the lira was spent in Piedmonte (index 1.638) one 
will possess five times more infrastructure than if it was spent it in 
Campania. The strong points of this index are the following: 
 
 a) it indicates some of the real costs of corruption and organized 
crime 
b) it it is built s on the sector where corruption is likely to be most 
significant in developed countries. 
c) it allows a direct comparison across areas since it focus on the same 
productive and administrative processes. 
d) it fits well with observers’ subjective impressions. 
 
It is not perfect, of course. The labor force in different parts of the 
country may not be equally efficient, public construction may be more 
resource-demanding in real terms due to difficult ground, mountains, 
                                                 
19  The latter indicator of the cumulated flow value represented a very cumbersome and in-
volved estimation reflecting historical developments in principle stretching back to the 
year of independence (1861)and until 1997.. 
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etc. Earthquakes may destroy public infrastructure in some regions 
and not in others leaving less infrastructure intact. But given the im-
portance of corruption in public works in Italy it is also likely to re-
flect differences in corruption propensities and other governance is-
sues, among which organized crime is likely to be severe and region-
ally concentrated. It is striking that Campania and Calabria20 both 
show extremely low public investment efficiency and both have had 
strong mafia organizations for a long time. This suggests that orga-
nized crime may stimulate corruption (and vice versa), but also that 
the effects of organized crime on cartel-making may be significant. In 
fact, mafia-organizations are well organized for the creation and moni-
toring of cartels (Schelling, 1984) 
 
Regarding the spread of mafia organization: Areas with high infra-
structure efficiency, but a high rate of “clean hand” legislator confes-
sions could indicate a spread of mafia-like activities from their base to 
this area.  
 
The research of Golden and Picci focused on the key mechanisms 
where both corruption and organized crime were linked to the impres-
sive development of infrastructure in the Mezzogiorno despite the 
waste and sometimes serious human misery caused by the various ma-
fia organizations. That development more than drug trade and traffick-
ing made rents collected from public procurement activities the major 
basis for mafia growth at the same time as it brought the Mafioso and 
the politicians at local and central level into closer contact.  
 
How close they were at the central level is not yet clarified. For exam-
ple, was the priority given to Mezzogiorno only due to the political 
decision to prioritize the poorest and least accessible parts of the coun-
try, or was it due to the fact that it was easier to build in larger politi-
cal rents in projects allocated there inclusive larger cuts at the central 
level? That is, was the political support for a more regionally equitable 
income growth as well as it’s partly lack of success connected to the 
same flourishing mechanisms of corruption and mafia growth?  
 
In any case, if this kind of indicator could be constructed for other 
countries too, it would be extremely helpful in order to assess corrup-
tion risks across countries at similar income and productive efficiency 
levels as Italy. If combined with further information it could also be 
used in assessing organized crime risks. Alas, it presupposes a huge 
statistical effort as the one made in Italy in aggregating real indicators 
                                                 
20  The results for Sicily and Apulia (Sacra Corona) are less striking, although both are quite 
corrupt also according to this index. Regarding Sicily the region is large and we know that 
the influence of the regular mafia is very uneven across the island (see Newell, 2006: 152) 
A possible explanation for Apulia is that the mafia organization there has been more into 
smuggling and trafficking not rent collection related to public construction. 
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for the quantity of public infrastructure stocks (a work inspired and 
made possible by the impressive infrastructure developments in Italy 
alluded to above) not available, as far as I know, elsewhere. 
 
6. Transitions to market economy – 
may organized crime become a 
lasting aftereffect? 
In a document sent from the office of the American Ambassador in 
Sofia as late as July 200521 it is told that they consider that 
 
  “The strength and immunity from law of organized crime (OC) groups is argua-
bly the most serious problem in Bulgaria today. OC activities underlie corruption 
and the ineffectiveness of the legal system in Bulgaria and inhibit the country’s 
economic development.”  
 
Whether this is a reasonable judgment or not, it has been widely 
shared.  
  
In the following we will focus on Bulgaria as another example where 
organized crime (including active and illegal use of means of vio-
lence) may rise also under industrial conditions – but this time quite 
suddenly – and become a significant economic and political phenom-
enon. Hopefully its shorter history will prove organized crime organi-
zations to become less entrenched than they have become in Italy.22 
 
It is well documented that organized, violent crime (as well as regular 
crime) increased during the transition to a market economy in most of 
the former socialist countries in Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
This is mostly explained by what happened during the transition – 
mainly the loss of livelihood or strong declassing of such groups as 
artists or wrestlers and the extreme uncertainty of property rights that 
characterized this period. As pointed out in Volkov (2000) regarding 
the latter we may find an important precursor in the old socialist sys-
tem in Bulgaria as well as in the former Soviet Union in the shape of 
the illegal market economy developed before the transition, but for the 
most part it is a recent phenomenon.  
 
Almost by definition any informal or illegal economy will give rise to 
the problems of how to protect property rights and how to implement 
contracts – problems where mafia organizations may become the solu-
                                                 
21  The document is found at Wikileak search engine 
http://cablesearch.org/cable/view.php?id=09STATE62392 , accessed March 8, 2011. 
22  It is reason to worry though. In a number of economic analyses of mafia forms of violent 
competition, such as Kumar and Skaperdas (2008), there appear to rise plausible stable 
equilibrium outcomes. 
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tions. Particularly in the areas where the illegal market economy con-
stituted a large share of the actual economy such as Azerbaijan and 
Georgia (about 50% in 1979 according to Alexeev and Pyle 2001) the 
original growth conditions for mafia-like organizations were excep-
tionally fertile- up to a point. However, in addition to informal vio-
lence-making capabilities to implement contracts the enterprises in-
volved were so highly visible that higher level protection from the 
Communist Party and the police, particularly the secret police, was 
also needed.23  
 
It was only after the centripetal forces of the state had weakened, that 
crimes of various sorts increased and the unofficial economy had to 
survive on its own, that politically independent mafia-like organiza-
tions really mattered and increased in numbers and members in the 
former Soviet union area. While the share of the informal economy in 
GDP indicates the demand for organized crime during the transition, 
the decline in output (and the corresponding increase in unemploy-
ment) suggests the size of the impact on the supply of recruitment. 
Using 1989 as the basis, production in Azerbaijan at it lowest point 
was only about 37% of 1989 production while Georgia’s constituted 
about 25% (Andvig 2002: 59) . 
 
Compared to these developments the positive shocks on the organized 
crime potential during the transition in Bulgaria were less dramatic, 
nor was its starting point so congenial. The relative size of the infor-
mal economy was around 30% in 1989 (Kyle et al, 2001) and its share 
of the total economy increased only with 4.4% (1996) and then de-
clined steeply (ibid.) so in 1998 it constituted only 22%.24 Moreover, 
the aggregate output fell only with about 37 %, a severe decline for 
sure, but around the average for the transition period of the former so-
cialist countries in Europe. 
 
Her we should add that there were also reasons external to the pro-
cesses emphasized here, which are likely to have stimulated organized 
crime in Bulgaria. The main one is that Bulgaria had for a variety of 
reasons better international networks into the former Soviet union than 
                                                 
23  Heidar Aliyev, the later president of Azerbaijan was an exceptionally clear case Starting 
out in the secret police and combining local party leadership with effective control of an 
organized crime network operating in a local economy where the illegal sector was about 
as large as the legal one.(Alexeev and Pyle 2001) His influence and private fortune was in 
the end transformed to Azeri presidency and effective control and private appropriation of 
a large share of the rents from of the local petroleum industry Shevardnadze in Georgia 
also led the local communist party watching an extraordinary growth of a local illegal 
economy, shared some of his features, but it was less clear-cut. Note that, somewhat sur-
prisingly, the size of the informal economy increased the first years after market princi-
ples were accepted as the ruling ones. According to Alexeev and Pyle (2001), in 1995 the 
share of the unofficial economy increased to 70% in Azerbaijan and 71% in Georgia. It 
has later subsided in both. 
24  Note that all these estimates of the informal economy size are very uncertain and rely on 
very doubtful assumptions about either electricity consumptions or constants i financial 
markets that may easily lead the estimates into wild directions 
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the other Balkan countries at the same time as it was relatively open 
towards Western Europe, which opened up for various brokering ac-
tivities, including criminal ones. Partly fed by those, organized crime 
would have also stronger pull in the processes we are focusing on. 
 
Bezlov et al (2007) organize their analysis of the rise of organized 
crime in Bulgaria mainly around the character of the supply shock: 
how the agents’ pre-transition original social and economic positions 
suddenly changed causing members of some groups to lose their live-
lihoods or status completely or in part. This led to a high propensity 
among members of some groups to join organized crime activities, 
highest if their former work experience was of some relevance for the 
new criminal tasks. The outcome was the rise of three distinct groups: 
1) the violent entrepreneurs, 2) the extreme-risk entrepreneurs, and 3) 
the oligarchs.25 The recruits to the 1) group were often former sports-
men in violent arts, former violent criminals or former members of the 
police; the recruits to 2) taxi drivers, bartenders, and if educated, ac-
countants, lawyers. 3) were recruited from groups who already had a 
position where they commanded labor power such as former commu-
nist party officials. 
 
Most of the activities that characterize organized crime such as violent 
competition for drug markets, trafficking, smuggling, plain extortion 
and racketeering, etc. – all needed to build up the financial resources 
for organized crime organization – is of secondary interest for us here. 
The question is whether such organizations had and have influence on 
public procurement. Or rather – in line with our definition – were pub-
lic procurement decisions heavily influenced by systematic strategies 
that contained both criminal and violent actions?  
 
Here we should note that for the first part of the period it was not pub-
lic procuring of assets, goods and services that was the key issue, but 
the somewhat symmetrical activity of selling public assets to private 
individuals or enterprises, privatization. During periods where states 
are weak, the ownership to the public assets becomes unclear and dis-
putable. Formally it belongs to the people, but in practice they have 
become a kind of non-agricultural commons ready for enclosure by 
agents who for various reasons are well positioned for it. Before it is a 
question of how the division of the rents between agents should be 
divided, the question is which individuals/public institutions will con-
quer the right to sell them and thereby also gain a position wherein it 
is possible to gain a share of the rent. There will be fights both ex ante 
and ex post of a privatization decision. With procurement most of the 
fights taking place are ex ante, ex post it is normally quite clear which 
                                                 
25  Note that the basis for classification applied on organized crime here is the type of agents, 
not the type of actions that we introduced in section 2. 
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organization that is the supplier, even who formally is the procurer, 
but who actually are influential is fuzzy in this case too ex ante and 
part of a political process that is difficult for outsiders to access, as we 
have noted before..  
 
Privatization is selling an asset, something which is supposed to last, 
while procurement deals mainly with short-run projects even when 
dealing with service contracts that in many cases should last for long, 
but rarely do. A lucky acquirement of a privatized asset implies an ex-
pectation of a lasting flow of rents. A good contract means only a one-
shot rent. Another difference is, of course that a public procurement 
operation normally means that something new has to be created. If 
that is an asset the exact ownership to it is not so essential. It may just 
remain fuzzy without any further consequence. With privatizing it be-
comes essential to establish exclusive ownership rights. 
 
Given the potential lack of clarity of who the rightful public disposer 
of a public asset is, the acquirer needs to defend his property right by 
political, legal and also potentially violent means. In practice it will 
often be embezzled by the person or group who dispose it before the 
privatization decision, that is he (they) will become the owner, in the 
end. If the asset is acquired illegally, it is a matter of definition wheth-
er the whole private enterprise activity that results should be consid-
ered an organized crime venture or not. The illegality increases the 
likelihood that the new ownership rights have to be defended by vio-
lent means, at least until it is accepted as the de facto situation. Need-
less to add, processes of illegal or illegitimate privatization of public 
assets protected by violent means are organized crime ventures ac-
cording to our definition. 
 
Rents in a privatization process means that the final private owner of a 
public asset normally buys it below its capitalized market value. If that 
is all that happens, it will be the new owner only that appropriates the 
whole rent. The effective disposer, if different from the new owner, 
could also receive a share if he could embezzle some of the funds re-
sulting from the sale of the asset, but this implies some form of finan-
cial fraud or weak accountancy at the public end. Another peaceful 
way to share the rent would be for the buyer to pay the disposer a 
bribe. The same problem arises here as for procurement decisions: 
who should be bribed? This needs a good knowledge of the political 
disposal process. In practice the problem may be even more compli-
cated than simply the allocation of bribes because it will not only be 
money involved, but political influence –promises and threats – will 
be traded. – And maybe – as just mentioned – also some violent 
threats.  
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We see here that there is much symmetry between the privatization 
and public procurement processes. In addition they may apply the 
same formal bidding systems when the pretence of mass ownership is 
shredded except that sale bids are based on highest possible and pro-
curement bids on the lowest possible price auctions.  
 
But the differences are also quite striking. When considering the role 
of organized (violent) crime, the needs for organized crime during a 
privatization process appears, ceteris paribus, to be much stronger 
than during flows of public procurement decisions due to the need of 
establishing and possibly re-establishing ex post ownership rights. 
 
Center for the Study of Democracy (2009) suggests a difference be-
tween the Bulgarian and Russian oligarchs that may point towards an 
interesting way corruption and organized crime interventions can have 
been linked in Bulgaria. The recent economic openness of Bulgaria 
has made many of the old state enterprises unprofitable even when in 
private hands. If that was forestalled, not much fighting will take place 
to get ownership rights to those assets, except26 for the cases where 
public procurement subsequently constitutes a large chunk of the de-
mand for their output or services that has remained highly profitable.27 
Hence, if this was the case the privatization processes may have been 
linked to the present public procurement processes where these enter-
prises are involved. 
 
Let us compare the ways organized crime impact public procurement 
including the political bribing games in Italy and Bulgaria. In both 
countries corruption in procurement processes is significant and orga-
nized killing for profit is not really rare, and may be linked sometimes 
to procurement (and privatization) decisions. In Italy the police and 
judiciary and the political system appear to be more permanently dif-
ferentiated, however, than in Bulgaria. This implies that mafia-like 
organizations would have less need for political protection to influ-
ence the judiciary. It should suffice to bribe the police, eventually the 
judiciary.28  
 
On the other hand, given the unreliability of the judiciary and the need 
to establish permanent ownership rights during the privatization pro-
                                                 
26  Their expected scrap value may of course be considerable, particularly so if the ownership 
of the assets also has given ownership rights to the associated land on which the assets are 
located. 
27  National preference in public procurement is not something unique for Bulgaria. Despite 
all the efforts by EU to ensure international bidding only 1.6% of public contracts are 
awarded to operators from other member states (European Commission, 2011:4). 
28  Note that in most former socialist states the judicial organizations had very little political 
independence at the outset, and rightly so since it was the party who could claim to repre-
sent the people’s feeling of justice. Harsh penalties and the fact that it was citizens, a hard 
cash carrying sector, who would be punished, meant that it was easy to collect bribes in 
this sector (Andvig, 2002). With a complete change in the conceptions of justice it was no 
wonder that this behavior was carried into the new order. 
32  Jens Christopher Andvig 
cess in Bulgaria, any owner may risk that some of his competitors 
may also bribe the judiciary to undo his ownership right which called 
for either a more permanent political protection or some violence ap-
paratus under his own control. Seen against this background it is 
somewhat surprising that there apparently are not built any violence 
apparatuses into core business organizations. Those apparatuses ap-
peared to have been functionally separated. The violence connected to 
public procurement and privatization processes appears to have been 
mainly outsourced in contract killings. Violence as well as corruption 
connected to private enterprises appears now to have subsided as these 
enterprises have gained in legal status or at least have become accept-
ed as part of the status quo distribution of power. 
 
 
7. Conclusions – or how to tell whether 
organized crime impact public pro-
curement? 
The extent of organized crime is in itself a phenomenon that is diffi-
cult locate empirically. For obvious reasons the agents involved will 
like to keep every aspects secret, actions as well as organization. The 
political processes likely to determine the outcomes of public pro-
curement contests are also likely to remain obscure for outsiders, in-
cluding researchers. To ask how unknown organized crime institutions 
may impact obscure procurement decision procedures and to expect 
precise, empirically based answers, border on foolishness. If that is the 
demand for presenting an analysis, we will, except for luck, have to 
exclude the study of the phenomenon and to know nothing. 
 
But to have an idea about how organized crime may become influen-
tial in procurement is important in some societies both for understand-
ing the actual workings of their governance processes and the actual 
allocation of public assets. Hopefully, a better understanding may also 
give us ideas of how the eventual impact of organized crime may be 
weakened.  
 
How to tell whether organized crime is an empirical issue or not? In 
the end one has to rely on the information the police are willing to 
convey, what citizens tell about from their eventual experience with 
such organizations, and what former members of organized crime or-
ganizations are willing to reveal. The rest is luck. While fear may 
make people silent it may also create wrong and often exaggerated 
perceptions about the size, extent and impact of the organized crime 
organizations including their cleverness.  
 
A number of external (to the organized crime units) indicators may 
reveal potential risks .High unemployment rates among youth or 
pockets of poverty may indicate potential supply risks. From the de-
mand side the relative size of the informal economy is significant. If 
large, contracts there need informal policing. Clear indications of high 
corruption rates among the police are clearly of direct significance. 
Here we have data – although not reliable ones – from a number of 
countries. High and uneven murder rates are another, potentially use-
ful indicator. Economic income levels are obviously important. Rich 
countries rarely develop organized crime organizations of real signifi-
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cance, but Italy is a partial exception. Income levels will also influ-
ence the sectors where organized crime may rise. The high wage rates 
for unskilled labor with potential violence skills in the sector could act 
as a stimulus. 
 
The historically deeply entrenched mafia-organizations in Italy and 
the sudden flare up of violent crime organizations in Bulgaria both 
suggest the importance of historical analysis, the path dependency of 
the phenomenon. Regarding organized crime’s potential impact on 
public procurement we noted that a procurement “market” has many 
of the used horse characteristics of Gambetta that may generate a de-
mand for a mafia-type of organization there, and particularly so if the 
allocation of the procurement decisions between political and bureau-
cratic institutions are not clear. At the supply side there is much to be 
gained for suppliers by cartelization, an arrangement that organized 
crime could easily facilitate. 
 
Of other factors worth mentioning we have seen that the organization-
al architecture that in fact links the police, the judiciary and the politi-
cal system, their mutual degree of independence may prove of signifi-
cance. For example, when pursued by independent magistrates politi-
cal protection would be in great demand by crime organizations. 
Whether it will be supplied, would of course hinge upon the political 
system and the degree of the politicians’ profit orientation. If we were 
to acquire any substantial empirical information, that will have to be 
collected from the courts, the police, or from informants that are fairly 
close to the procurement process. In general, we may be satisfied with 
something much less solid and informative: a risk analysis. 
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